THE United States and Israel miscalculated when they opened an all-out attack against Iran on February 28, 2026. Washington, more than Tel Aviv, believed that a massive strike on Iran that included the assassination of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would bring the Iranians to the table for a surrender. It turned out that Iran had anticipated the moves from their adversaries and had prepared layers of leadership and structures of command and control to continue the resistance despite enormous losses; not only that, but Iran had deployed its resources strategically to strike US military targets in the Gulf Arab states, strike Israeli targets in the heart of the country (including Tel Aviv), and restricted access through the Strait of Hormuz. What Iran did in the few weeks after the war turned the tide against the US and Israel, with Iran in possession of the upper hand in the conflict. US President Donald Trump promised to wipe out Iranian civilisation out of frustration but then paused hastily – his threats empty – as he sent off his Vice President JD Vance to Pakistan for peace talks, the first time high-level US and Iranian leaders met each other since 1979.

The talks, within a two-week ceasefire, have stalled. They should have ended on April 22, but the US asked that the ceasefire be extended unconditionally. Iran has insisted on meaningful sanctions relief and has asserted its right to enrich uranium domestically and rejects full disarmament. In the background, Iran has maintained that the illegal and brutal attack on Lebanon by Israel must be ended and has stressed the rights of the Palestinians. The US rejects Iran’s positions, while Israel continues its murderous bombing and occupation of a large part of Lebanon and continues its genocide against the Palestinians. For Iran, the US and Israel are not good faith actors in any negotiation because they have not honoured past agreements and indeed began this current barrage in the midst of negotiations that had almost reached a very strong settlement on all issues. The West has insisted that Iran is being defiant, which of course it is, but this defiance is not without logic: what Iran proclaims is its sovereignty under the United Nations Charter (1945), which has been violated by the US and Israel through their illegal attack on Iran (against Article 2) and through the third-party sanctions policy maintained by the US (against Chapter VII).

Under Pressure

Since November 1979, Iran has faced US economic sanctions, diplomatic ultimatums, and a massive military escalation (Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980 on behalf of the West and the Gulf Arabs). The United States, since 1979, has combined threats and blockades with negotiations, while Israel has continued military operations in the region. Iranian officials have consistently rejected the idea that pressure can dictate outcomes. One senior Iranian official told Press TV that his country ‘will end the war when it decides’, and this would only happen ‘when its own conditions are met’. This statement captures the core of Iran’s position. It is not refusal to negotiate outright, but it refusal to negotiate on imposed terms. Sovereignty, for the Iranians, cannot be traded away under duress.

Iran’s entire negotiation posture has been defined by its willingness to reject proposals that it considers unequal. After the first set of talks in Islamabad failed, Iranian officials said that the US tried to impose ‘excessive demands’ and ‘unrealistic expectations’ from Washington and Tel Aviv. This refusal has not been rhetorical alone. The Iranians have been brave enough to walk away from the negotiations due to the failure of the US to take seriously the Iranian proposals, such as the lifting of blockades. Iran’s parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf underscored the issue of trust, nothing that proposals were discussed but the US had ‘failed to gain the trust of the Iranian delegation’. Such statements reflect a broader stance: negotiation is acceptable, but only if it is grounded in reciprocity rather than coercion. A recurrent theme in Iranian statements is the insistence on what officials describe as their ‘inalienable right’ to pursue national policies, particularly regarding peaceful nuclear technology. This phrase – ‘inalienable right’ – is not incidental. It signals that, for Iran, the issue is not merely technical, namely, how much uranium to enrich or how many centrifuges to operate, but political, namely who has the authority to decide on Iran’s policy formation.

The Iranians are within their rights to mistrust the US, which has played fast and loose with negotiations. From 1979, there are instances of when the US and Iran came close to agreements when the United States withdrew. This starts with the Algiers Accords (1981-1984), when the US and Iran could have stabilised relations but the US supported Iraq in the war and it expanded sanctions; it deepens when US President George W. Bush ignored a proposal (written by Iran’s Ambassador to France, Mohammad Sadegh Kharazi) from Iran via Switzerland offering a Grand Bargain in 2003; the shocking unilateral withdrawal of the US in 2018 from the 2015 JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), negotiated over two years by Iran with the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, is the third example. While Iran’s diplomats came close to an agreement with the US over the nuclear question, the US and Israel began this assault on Iran – underlining the lack of faith in any negotiation with the US. Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian said recently that a ‘deep historical mistrust in Iran toward US government conduct remains, while unconstructive and contradictory signals from American officials carry a bitter message; they seek Iran’s surrender. Iranians do not submit to force’. Pezeshkian said that Iran is not against negotiations, but that disputes should be handled ‘through reason and in a calm environment’. This combination – openness to dialogue alongside firm boundaries – defines Iran’s current posture.

Negotiations through Reason

Iran’s position is strengthened through its strategic decisions, such as the restrictions placed on commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. A senior Iranian official said that fully opening the Strait was ‘impossible’ under conditions of continued ‘maximum pressure’ and aggressive war by the US and Israel. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps reinforced the message, insisting that the Strait ‘will not be opened to the enemies of the nation’. Iran’s resistance remains active and calculated, using its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz as a major point in the bargain that it will strike.

Iran’s style has not been purely confrontational nor fully conciliatory, since it seeks to utilise its strategic gains to get the best deal from the US. It is this forthrightness that has earned Iran esteem from across the Global South – billions of people amazed by the fact that Iran did not surrender to the US despite the atrocious attack on it, and that Iran was able to attack the US positions in the Gulf Arab states and Israel, and that Iran continued to hold an escalation ladder in the war (including holding back its proxies from attacking US positions, for instance in Iraq). Iran’s position signals that even under severe constraints, a state can maintain its autonomy. Iranian rhetoric often reflects this broader perspective. Officials frame their actions not only as national defence but as resistance to domination. This framing resonates internationally, particularly where questions of sovereignty and external intervention remain sensitive.

While there is a temptation to believe that the resilience in Iran is due to the ideas of martyrdom that emerges from Shia Islam, but that is an insufficient belief. The fight that Iran is waging is built on the foundation of Iranian nationalism that is certainly strengthened by the traditions of Shia Islam, but it is rooted much more in the thousands of years of Iranian civilisation and the decades of struggle to build liberal and socialist forms of national liberation in the society. There is a living archive of evidence of this great tradition. For example, three years after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the poet Simin Behbahani wrote a lyrical poem that gives us a striking example of these multiple roots of Iranian nationalism, the basis of the stubborn resistance to imperialism:

My country, I will build you again,

if need be, with bricks made from my life.

I will build columns to support your roof,

if need be, with my bones.