THE illegal US-Israeli war on Iran has entered a dangerous new phase. What began in late February as a coordinated United States–Israeli military campaign aimed at crippling Iran’s nuclear energy and missile infrastructure has evolved into a prolonged regional conflict with profound geopolitical consequences. Over the past week, the fragile ceasefire negotiated in April has steadily deteriorated, with renewed clashes in the Strait of Hormuz threatening to engulf the Persian Gulf in a wider war.

The immediate trigger for the current escalation has been the struggle over control of the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly one-fifth of global oil supplies pass. Iran has sought to leverage its strategic position by tightening control over maritime traffic, while the US has responded with naval operations and a de facto blockade of Iranian shipping. Near the Strait, US destroyers and Iranian naval units confronted each other with exchanges of missiles, drone attacks, and retaliatory airstrikes. Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi said, ‘Every time a diplomatic solution is on the table, the US opts for a reckless military adventure’. The attempt to open the Strait by force is one of those acts that threatened to sink any hope of a deal between Iran and US-Israel. On May 7 and 8, US aircraft struck Iranian-flagged tankers that the US accused of attempting to breach its blockade of the Strait. Washington described the attacks – weirdly – as ‘defensive’, claiming that Iranian forces had launched missiles and drones against US naval vessels. Tehran, meanwhile, condemned the strikes as violations of the ceasefire and accused the US of targeting civilian infrastructure (the US had hit unarmed tankers). The ceasefire exists largely on paper. In practice, the region remains in a state of undeclared war. Oil markets reacted sharply, with crude prices surging above $100 with an expectation that it might go as high as $150 per barrel if Hormuz becomes fully impassable. Shipping disruptions have stranded hundreds of vessels and intensified anxieties across Asia and Europe regarding energy supplies.

The US has attempted to frame its strategy as one of ‘freedom of navigation’, based on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (which the United States has not ratified). Yet Washington’s actions reveal a broader objective: to weaken Iran’s regional position while preserving US military dominance over Gulf energy routes. The campaign, initially branded Operation Epic Fury, has shifted toward maritime enforcement operations, including the escorting of commercial vessels and the interdiction of Iranian oil exports.

Iran, however, has proven far more resilient than US planners anticipated. Satellite investigations published this week suggest that Iranian missile and drone strikes have inflicted extensive damage on US military facilities across the region, including bases in Iraq and the Gulf monarchies. Hundreds of structures have reportedly been damaged, with significant casualties among American personnel. Despite the statements by the US that it has wiped out Iran’s missile capability, a CIA report, published in the Washington Post, says that Iran continues to hold 70% of its pre-war missile stock and that these are capable of being launched at US and Israeli targets across the region. The US believes that if it blocks the exit of Iran’s oil, the Iranian oil production facilities will run out of storage within a short period of time. But analysts of Iran’s oil system say that the country will be able to store pumped oil for weeks, if not months. Iran, therefore, will be able tolerate a long period of struggle and will have the capacity to strike Israel and US targets in the region with its long-range missile stock.

The conflict has also intensified the already unstable regional environment. In Lebanon, exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah continue despite ceasefire arrangements. In the Gulf, the United Arab Emirates has intercepted Iranian missiles and drones, further entangling itself in the confrontation. But perhaps the most important political development emerging from the past week has been the growing tension between Saudi Arabia and the US.

SAUDI ARABIA’S UNEASE

Saudi Arabia entered this conflict reluctantly. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has spent the past several years attempting to stabilise the kingdom’s regional environment to pursue his ambitious economic modernisation agenda, Vision 2030. At an event of Saudi Arabia’s Council of Economic and Development Affairs, bin Salman said that the kingdom has delivered ‘qualitative achievements’ and will continue to do so as it builds its Public Investment Fund and National Development Fund, designed to drive domestic savings and investment. His focus has been on development and not on conflict. The normalisation process with Iran, brokered by China in 2023, reflected Riyadh’s desire to reduce confrontation and secure the Gulf from precisely the kind of war now unfolding. The US-Israeli campaign against Iran has disrupted this strategy completely.

Although Saudi Arabia remains formally aligned with Washington, Riyadh has grown increasingly uneasy about the consequences of the war. The closure and militarisation of the Strait of Hormuz threaten Saudi oil exports and undermine investor confidence at a moment when the kingdom seeks massive foreign capital inflows. Analysts now note that the war has forced Saudi policymakers to reconsider the costs of dependence on the US for security. This tension became more visible as Saudi officials reportedly resisted US pressure for deeper military coordination against Iran. Riyadh fears becoming a direct target of Iranian retaliation. Tehran has already demonstrated its willingness to strike Gulf states aligned with Washington, and Saudi infrastructure remains highly vulnerable despite years of arms purchases from the US.

Equally significant is Saudi frustration with Washington’s handling of the crisis. The Trump administration appears determined to maintain military pressure on Iran even while speaking of negotiations. This contradictory approach alarms Riyadh, which sees the prolonged instability as economically catastrophic. The kingdom remembers well the 2019 attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais, which exposed the limits of US security guarantees. There is also a broader strategic issue. Saudi Arabia increasingly perceives that Washington’s regional policy is being driven not by Gulf security interests but by Israel’s confrontation with Iran. This perception has widened political distance between Riyadh and Washington, even if public disagreements remain muted. The kingdom’s response has therefore been cautious balancing. Saudi Arabia has avoided direct participation in offensive operations while quietly expanding diplomatic contacts with China, Pakistan, and other regional actors seeking de-escalation. China’s growing role is particularly noteworthy. Beijing, heavily dependent on Gulf energy supplies, has intensified diplomatic engagement and positioned itself as a mediator calling for a ‘comprehensive ceasefire’.

The war is thus accelerating an important geopolitical transition: the gradual erosion of unquestioned US primacy in the Gulf.

A DANGEROUS IMPASSE

The US and Israel possess overwhelming airpower, but Iran retains significant missile capabilities and the capacity to disrupt maritime trade. Iran has suffered enormous destruction, yet the state has not collapsed. Meanwhile, Washington faces rising military costs, growing regional instability, and mounting domestic economic pressures from energy inflation. This is the classic pattern of imperial overreach. Military superiority does not automatically translate into political success. Instead, the war has destabilised the region, strengthened anti-US sentiment, and exposed fractures within the US-led Gulf alliance system.

The danger now is escalation through miscalculation. A direct strike on Saudi infrastructure, a mass casualty attack on US forces, or the complete closure of Hormuz could trigger a far wider regional war with devastating global consequences.

The peoples of West Asia continue to pay the price for the US-Israeli war. What is urgently required is not further escalation, but a regional security framework based on diplomacy, sovereignty, and non-interference. This is what has been called a Grand Bargain. It is what the Iran-Saudi Arabia-China trilateral agreement and process was meant to attain (through meetings in Beijing in 2023, Riyadh in 2024, and Tehran in 2025). All three states have strategic reasons to preserve the process – Iran wants to avoid total regional isolation, Saudi Arabia wants regional stability for its Vision 2030, and China wants to emerge as a diplomatic power in West Asia. In the December 2025 meeting in Tehran, all three countries reaffirmed their commitment to the Beijing Agreement, and as far as officials now say, that commitment has not been broken during this war – but, in fact, redoubled.

Even amidst war, the Beijing process between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China endures because none of the three can afford its collapse. If there remains any path away from US-Israeli imposed catastrophe in West Asia, it lies not through military escalation, but through diplomacy, sovereignty, regional cooperation, and the construction of a genuine Grand Bargain.