EUROPEAN states have been gradually building up an aggressive posture in the context of the war in Ukraine. As the United States, under President Donald Trump, has called for a ceasefire and peace talks, European leaders have been urging more military supplies for Ukraine. On April 11, 2025, the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, once led by the US and now led by Germany and the United Kingdom, pledged an additional €21 billion in military aid to Ukraine. Meeting at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Brussels, the defence ministers of the fifty-five members of the Contact Group discussed the gains made by Russia in the past few weeks and the need for Ukraine to have greater air defence capabilities. They agreed to build up their military industrial capacity so that they support a war that has become increasingly difficult for Ukraine to sustain.

It is important to register, however, that despite the headline of €21 billion, most of this aid will come over four years – which, in the context of an ongoing war, is not very useful at all. Germany’s defence minister, Boris Pistorius, who is member of the Social Democratic Party, told the media, ‘Ukraine needs a strong military and only then can the negotiation process lead to a just and lasting peace’. Even amidst Ukraine’s strongest supporters, the idea of defeating Russia is no longer on the table and the process for peace – pushed by US President Donald Trump – is now cemented.

PINCH OF SALT

Europe’s credibility regarding its obligations to Ukraine remains untested. These monetary pledges and the promises of military equipment transfers come with a pinch of salt. To illustrate the actuality of the aid, let us look at Germany’s commitments. In 2024, Germany made the largest commitment to Ukraine, amounting to €17 billion in military and non-military aid. For that year alone, Germany budgeted €7–8 billion in military aid (the rest was for humanitarian support and economic aid). But it is important to know that this aid does not come in one tranche. In 2025, Germany will provide Ukraine with €4 billion in (largely) in-kind military aid through the provision of crucial equipment. This has been the way Germany has supported Ukraine with military equipment worth €2 billion (2022), €4.4 billion (2023), and €8.1 billion (2024). For comparison, the United States had provided Ukraine with €18.1 billion in 2024, before Trump began to draw down the assistance to that country.

CAN EUROPE FIGHT?

Europe’s main countries understand they simply do not have the military capacity to undertake a war against an adversary like Russia without the active military support of the United States through NATO. For example, studies by the German government show that it could only withstand two to three days of intensive fighting, far below NATO’s standard of being prepared for a thirty-day intense war. The German military, the Bundeswehr, comprises 180,000 soldiers, below the target of 203,000, while most of its heavy equipment – such as its Leopard II tanks and its air defence systems – are committed already to Ukraine and those that are not, have maintenance problems. The German air force – the Luftwaffe – has a small fleet of Panavia Tornado and Eurofighter Typhoon fighters, but the former are now forty years old, while there are simply not enough of the latter in operation. This is precisely why the German government announced the Zeitenwende (historical turning point) with €100 billion allocated to military modernisation. But even the most optimistic German analysts say that German military capability can only be improved by the end of the decade.

French military analysts and lawmakers are not as despondent as the Germans. While the latter say that they will be able to endure less than a week of intense warfare, the French claim that they can withstand two months of full-scale war. In December 2024, Senators Hugues Saury and Hélène Conway-Mouret indicated in a report that their country should be able to do so if they have enough ammunition. In March 2022, however, Senator Christian Cambon (at the time chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee) said that France had only ‘fifteen days of ammunition’ or even ‘three or four’ days. A study by the French government showed that its defence industry could only produce five hundred 155mm shells per year at a time when the Ukraine forces used seven thousand shells a day. A credible assessment of France’s capacity shows that a total upgrade of its military capacity cannot take place before 2030.

Across the English Channel, anxiety about its military capacity has occasioned reports after reports about the lack of its military power, including the UK House of Commons Defence Committee (2003), the UK Defence Command Paper (2023), the UK Defence Strategy Review (2023), and the UK House of Lords Defence Paper (2024). The latter report candidly notes that ‘the size of the Army has been reduced to a level which is not sustainable in the event of a prolonged conflict’. It is also important to bear in mind that most of these reports are written by hawks who use them to argue for greater military funding. But there is a kernel of truth about the lack of preparedness of the British armed forces. General Sir Richard Barrons, the head of the UK Joint Forces Command, told The Times in 2023, ‘The British Army would be wiped out in a day in a war with Russia, and the UK would take five to ten years to field a modern, warfighting division’. Even if this is moderately exaggerated, it is a sign of the limited capacity of the UK – without full US and therefore NATO support – to carry out a military operation against a power such as Russia.

Earlier, in January 2024, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland agreed to facilitate a military transport corridor that would allow transit of military equipment without any barriers. Germany’s then parliamentary state secretary for defence Simtje Möller said that this would take Europe ‘on the road to a true military Schengen’. The Schengen Area allows free movement of people across Europe. This principle is now being used to assert the right of military equipment and military personnel to cross borders without any need for long drawn-out checks. But again, these announcements are largely symbolic. The rail gauge in different parts of Europe differ, and the bridges are of different sizes for military transport. To make these harmonious would cost more money than Europe has at its disposal. That is why Germany is building a military base in Lithuania so that it could easily airlift troops there if necessary. But this is a small base in a small country that would not like to get involved directly in a large-scale military conflict.

In sum, Germany, France, and the UK do not have the capacity to fight the Russians in a full-scale war without US and NATO support.

EUROPE’S PROVOCATIONS

In December 2024, a YouGov poll was published about European public opinion regarding the war in Ukraine. The poll followed public opinion in seven countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These are the main governments that support a continuation of the war. In these countries, support for the prolongation of the war has dropped dramatically. For instance, in January 2024, half of the British population said that they would support Ukraine ‘until it wins’, but by the end of the year, only 37 per cent held that opinion. Similar declines can be seen in France and Germany. In every country, there has been an increase in the view that the war must come to a negotiated end even if this means that Russia will control parts of Ukraine (the Crimea and the eastern districts of the country). In March 2025, however, largely due to the intransigence of the European leadership and the advantages secured by Russia on the battlefield, sections of the European public began to show more sympathy for Ukraine; but even this was muted, since it was merely demonstrated by a call for Ukraine to be included in the peace negotiations not for the continuation of the war.

But the European leadership – especially the unelected European High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas (former prime minister of Estonia) – has continued to insist on greater military and financial support for Ukraine and to slow down talks for peace. In April, Kallas said, ‘It’s time to rearm, reequip, and stand ready for Europe’s defence. We will use every lever we have – from adapting fiscal rules for defence spending, to mobilising our EU budget, to new loans for joint procurement of equipment. We must also step up our support to Ukraine’. The term ‘rearm’ is borrowed from the EU President Ursula Van Der Leyen’s Rearm Europe plan. Neither Kallas nor Van Der Leyen are elected to their posts by the European people.

NATO will hold its annual meeting in June in Brussels. These contradictions – between Europe’s aggressive statements about Russia and Europe’s own military capacity as well as the growing sentiment amongst the European public to end this war – will perhaps be discussed around the NATO table. What Trump will say is unclear. His team has made it plain that they want the war in Ukraine to be brought to a swift end. The difference of opinion between Europe and the United States will not be helped by the threats of tariffs and the turbulence of world trade. A lot can happen between April and June in a world that has Donald Trump as the president of the United States.